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Why an Employer Does Not Have to Answer for 
Preventing an Employee with a Disability from Utilizing 
Corrective Measures: The Relationship Between 
Mitigation and Reasonable Accommodation* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act 
("ADA") of 1990,1 one of the enumerated purposes of the statute was to 
eliminate "discrimination against individuals with disabilities."2 Various 
obstacles have prevented the ADA from fully accomplishing that pur-
pose. Restrictive judicially created standards for summary judgment in 
ADA claims for employment discrimination have severely inhibited 
many disabled individuals' opportunities to receive redress. 
A threshold question in an ADA claim for employment discrimina-
tion is whether the plaintiff is a "qualified individual with a disability.''3 
This Note addresses a current loophole for employers. If a claimant can 
utilize mitigating measures to correct her disability but her employer 
prevents her from doing so, an ADA suit by that claimant may not sur-
vive summary judgment because the claimant may not be a "qualified 
individual with a disability." Part II provides an overview of the em-
ployment portion of the ADA and recent Supreme Court decisions relat-
ing to the Act, focusing on what is necessary for a plaintiff to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment. Part Ill explores Nawrot v. CPC Interna-
tional, 4 the primary case of this Note. Nawrot is an ADA employment 
discrimination case filed in the U.S. District Court of the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois in which the plaintiff failed to defeat the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment. Part IV argues for a single qualification test 
to evaluate whether a claimant qualifies to bring an ADA employment 
discrimination claim, rather than the currently employed bifurcated 
qualification test. Nawrot provides one example of how this test could 
* Copyright © 2001 by Thad LeVar. Comments are welcome and can be directed to 
THAD@BYU.NET. 
I. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
2. 42 U.S.C. ~ 1210l(b)(l). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a). 
4. No. 99 C 630, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 8973 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2000). 
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close the loophole for employers who prohibit employees from utilizing 
mitigating measures to correct disabilities. Part V summarizes the differ-
ences between the single qualification test and the bifurcated qualifica-
tion test. 
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
Congress declared in the ADA that "historically, society has tended 
to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,"5 that such dis-
crimination continues "to be a serious and pervasive social problem,"6 
that "individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of 
disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimina-
tion,"7 that individuals with disabilities have been "relegated to a position 
of political powerlessness in our society ... resulting from stereotypic 
assumptions,"8 and that "the continuing existence of unfair and unneces-
sary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the op-
portunity to compete on an equal basis."9 One enumerated purpose of the 
ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of unnecessary discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities."10 Title I of the ADA deals with employment. 11 
A. The Bifurcated Qualification Test 
The general rule of Title I provides that no employer "shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the dis-
ability of such individua1." 12 Federal courts have established that for a 
claimant to establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination by 
an employer, she must establish: "(1) that she is disabled within the 
meaning of the [ADA]; (2) that she is qualified to perform the essential 
functions of the job either with or without accommodation; and (3) that 
she has suffered adverse employment action because of the disability." 13 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). 
6. !d. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9). 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l). 
II. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
13. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Benson 
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995)). See also White v. York Int'1 Corp., 
45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (lOth Cir. 1995); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209,212 (4th Cir. 
1994); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 
1390 (5th Cir. 1993); Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 640-42 (2d Cir. 1991); Lucero v. Hart, 915 
F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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This Note refers to the first two prongs of that three part test as the bifur-
cated qualification test because it bifurcates, or splits, the "qualified indi-
vidual with a disability" 14 standard of the ADA into two tests: (1) 
whether a claimant has a disability, and (2) whether that claimant is a 
qualified individual. 
It is difficult to meet the bifurcated qualification test of first estab-
lishing that the claimant has a disability and then that the claimant is a 
qualified individual. As a result, most ADA claims for employment dis-
crimination do not survive summary judgment. No single explanation 
can completely explain that phenomena, but it is certain that current 
ADA case law establishes a high threshold for a plaintiff to get a claim 
before a jury. 15 Because motions for summary judgment are so prevalent 
in ADA cases, this Note's primary focus is on one of the many instances 
in which a claimant loses an ADA case on summary judgment. 
The initial question in the bifurcated qualification test, determining 
whether an individual has a disability, relies on the ADA definition of 
"disability." This definition includes: "(A) a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being re-
garded as having such an impairment." 16 Often, the most difficult hurdle 
for plaintiffs is to establish that their disability limits a major life activ-
. 17 Jty. 
B. Surviving Summary Judgment Under the ADA: Mitigation 
Prior to 1999, the legislative history of the ADA, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines, and federal case law cre-
ated uncertainty regarding whether a court, when determining whether an 
14. 42 U.S.C. ~ 12lll(X). 
15. Compare Ruth Calker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Wind{allfiJr Defendants, 
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L Rrov. 99, 101 (1999) (noting that 93% of ADA cases in U.S. District Courts 
and 84'Y,, at the appellate level bring results tor defendants, asserting that federal judges "are abusing 
the summary judgment device and failing to defer to agency guidance in interpreting the ADA."), 
with JctTrcy A. Van Della & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintij(1· 
Losing Summwy Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better BefiJre a Jury? A Response to 
Professor Colker, 19 REV. LiTI<i. 505 (2000) (arguing that one reason for the high summary judg-
ment rate in ADA cases is inadequate representation by plaintiffs' attorneys). 
16. 42 U.S. C. ~ 121 02(2)(A)-(C). This Note does not address the unique issues involved in 
defining a disability under each of these three tests, but rather focuses on how to define a condition 
that substantially limits a major life activity. That definition is crucial to all three tests. 
17. For example, the law is not entirely clear about whether "working" qualifies as a major 
life activity. While the EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) takes the position that 
under certain circumstances working does qualify as a major life activity, see 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2000), the Supreme Court has declined to rule definitively on the issue. See, e.g., 
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471,492 (1999) ("Assuming without deciding that working is a 
major life activity ... "). 
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an individual has a disability, should consider mitigating measures that 
an individual can utilize to correct her impairment's The legislative his-
tory of the ADA contains statements that could support either result. 19 
EEOC guidelines prior to 1999 favored evaluating a disability without 
reference to mitigating measures.2° Federal courts were split. Most cir-
cuits followed the EEOC position, including the First, Second, Third, 
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.21 The Sixth and Tenth 
Circuits ruled contrary to the EEOC position, holding that disability 
analysis requires consideration of mitigating measures.22 The Supreme 
Court settled the issue in 1999 with the "Sutton Trilogy."23 
1. Sutton 
In Sutton, petitioners with severe myopia were not hired by United 
Airlines because of a requirement mandating uncorrected visual acuity of 
201100 or better?4 The petitioners brought an ADA action alleging that 
18. See Timothy S. Bland & Thomas J. Walsh, Jr., US Supreme Court Resolves Mitigating 
Measures Issue Under the ADA, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. I, 7-15 ( 1999); Joshua C. Dickinson. Will the 
Supreme Court Allow Employers to Consider Reasonable Mitigating Measures not Present~v Util-
ized by Employees When Determining Whether a '"Disability .. Exists Under Section A o/the ADA"· 
68 UMKC L. REV. 389,391-94 (2000); Perry Meadows, M.D. & Richard A. Bales. Using Mitigating 
Measures to Determine Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 45 S.D. L. REV. 33, 
39-44 (2000); Stacie E. Barhorst, Note, What Does Disability Mean: The Americans with /)isabili-
ties Act o/1990 in the Afiermath o/Sutton, Murphy, and Albertsons, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 137, 138-
151 (1999). 
19. The House Labor Report on the ADA states that a disability "should be assessed without 
regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodation or auxiliary 
aids." H.R. REP. No. I 01-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990). The Senate Labor and Human Resources Commit-
tee Report contains an identical statement, but further indicates that the focus should be on the ef-
fects of the impairment, rather than the qualities of the impairment. S. REP. No. I 01-1 16. at 22-24 
( 1989). See also Bland & Walsh, supra note 18, at 7-8; Meadows & Bales, supra note I X, at 39-40. 
20. "[T]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life ac-
tivity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medi-
cines, or assistive or prosthetic devices." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2Ul ( 1998). The EEOC deleted this 
statement from the regulations in 2000. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2Ul (2000). 
21. See, e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998); Baert v. 
Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law 
Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321,329 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated in part by Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 
624 (8th Cir. 1997); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997); 
Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516 (lith Cir. 1996). See also Bland & Walsh, supra 
note 18, at 12-15; Dickinson, supra note 18, at 393-94; Meadows & Bales, supra note 18, at 42-43; 
Barhorst, supra note 18, at 146-48. 
22. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767-68 (6th Cir. 1997); Sutton v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (lOth Cir. 1997). See also Bland & Walsh, supra note 18, at 10-12; 
Dickinson, supra note 18, at 393-94; Meadows & Bales, supra note 18, at 43; Barhorst, supra note 
18, at 148-50. 
23. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc., 527 U.S. 516 ( 1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 ( 1999). See also Meadows 
& Bales, supra note 18, at 44 (referring to the "Sutton Trilogy"). 
24. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76. 
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they had an impairment that substantially limited them in the major life 
activity of working, and that they were regarded as having such an im-
pairment.25 The District Court granted summary judgment for United 
Airlines because the petitioners could correct their vision and thus were 
not substantially limited in any major life activity?6 In addition, the 
Court stated that "petitioners had alleged only that respondent regarded 
them as unable to satisfy the requirements of a particular job," therefore 
they "had not stated a claim that they were regarded as substantially lim-
ited in the major life activity ofworking."27 The Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed.n 
The Supreme Court also affirmed, with Justice O'Connor writing for 
the majority, stating that "disability under the [ADA] is to be determined 
with reference to corrective measures."29 The majority rejected the 
EEOC guidelines30 as "an impermissible interpretation of the ADA," not-
ing that because "by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner, 
we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history."31 
Justice 0 'Connor provided three reasons for this decision. 32 First, 
because the phrase "substantially limits" appears in the definition of 
"disability" in the "present indicative verb form,"33 that term requires 
"that a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically - substan-
tially limited. "34 Second, because the "disability" definition requires an 
evaluation of "whether an impairment substantially limits the 'major life 
activities of such individual, "'35 that evaluation should be an individual-
ized one.36 Evaluating individuals without reference to mitigation would 
require treating individuals "as members of a group of people with simi-
lar impairments, rather than as individuals."37 Justice O'Connor also 
pointed out that a failure to consider mitigating measures would preclude 
consideration of any negative side effects of mitigation, a result "incon-
sistent with the individualized approach of the ADA."3x Third, the Court 
noted that in the findings of the ADA, Congress found that "some 
25. Sec id 
26. Sec id 
27. !d. at476-77. 
2X. Sec id at 4 77. 
29. !d. at 4XX. 
30. Sec supa note 20 and accompanying text. 
ll. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 4X2. 
32. See id 
13. /J. Seealso42 U.S.C. ~ 12102(2)(A)(I994). 
34. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 4X2. 
35. ld at4X3 (quoting42 U.S.C. ~ 12102(2)). 
36. Sec id (citations omitted). 
37. !d. at 4X3. 
3X. ld at 4X4. 
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43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabili-
ties."39 Concluding that this figure is inconsistent with a definition of 
"disability" that does not consider mitigating measures, the majority 
evaluated statistics and reports to support that position.40 
Justice O'Connor then evaluated whether the petitioners were re-
garded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. The 
EEOC recognizes work as a major life activity, but defines "substantially 
limited" in that context as being: 
[S]ignificantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs 
or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average 
person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. The inability to 
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limita-
tion in the major life activity ofworking.41 
"Assuming without deciding that working is a major life activity and 
that the EEOC regulations interpreting the term 'substantially limits' are 
reasonable,"42 the majority concluded that the petitioners' impairment 
did not meet the EEOC standard.43 While the petitioners alleged that 
United Airlines regarded their impairment as preventing them from hold-
ing "global airline pilot" positions, that single job did not qualify as a 
class or broad range of jobs, particularly where the petitioners were not 
precluded from other types of pilot jobs.44 
2. Murphy 
In addition to clarifying other aspects of ADA law, the Supreme 
Court applied the mitigation doctrine to two specific circumstances in the 
other cases of the Sutton Trilogy. In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc., the Court classified the petitioner's blood pressure medication as a 
mitigating measure that a court must consider when determining whether 
the petitioner had a disability.45 
3. Albertson's 
In Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the petitioner suffered from "am-
blyopia, an uncorrectable condition that leaves him with 20/200 vision in 
39. !d. (quoting42 U.S.C. 12IOI(a)(l)). 
40. See id. at 484-88. 
41. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)). See also 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2000) (containing the same guideline). 
42. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. 
43. See id. at 493. 
44. See id. 
45. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516,521 (1999). 
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his left eye and monocular vision in effect." 46 After addressing other is-
sues, the majority pointed out that subconscious mechanisms for coping 
with an impairment constitute mitigating measures, noting that "[ w ]e see 
no principled basis for distinguishing between measures undertaken with 
artificial aids, like medications and devices, and measures undertaken, 
whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems."47 The major-
ity pointed out that monocularity must be proved as a disability with ref-
erence to an individual's "own experience."4~ 
C. Surviving Summary Judgment Under the ADA: Reasonable 
Accommodation 
The ADA requires an evaluation of reasonable accommodation at 
two levels of a claim. If a claimant demonstrates that she has a disability 
under the ADA, she still must establish that she is a "qualified individual 
with a disability" to survive summary judgment.49 The ADA defines a 
"qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability 
who, with or without reasonable accommodations, can perform the es-
sential functions of the employment position that such individual holds 
or desires."50 Additionally, the ADA definition of "discriminate" in-
cludes "not making reasonable accommodations" for the employee 
unless the employer "can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such cov-
ered entity."51 The ADA provides some examples of what reasonable ac-
commodation may require. 52 
Thus, to survive summary judgment against the claimant, that claim-
ant may have to provide evidence of reasonable accommodations that 
would enable her to "perform the essential functions" of the job.53 Addi-
46. Albertson's, Inc. v Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 559 ( 1999). 
47. /d. at 565-66. 
4X. /d. at567. 
49. 42 U.S.C.§ 12lii(S) (1994). 
50. /d. 
51. 42 U.S.C.§ 12112(b)(5)(A). 
52. The ADA docs not specifically define reasonable accommodation, but states thai it "'may 
include": 
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by in-
dividuals with disabilities; and 
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant po-
sition, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or 
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified 
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabili-
ties. 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A)-(B). The ADA also provides guidelines for what constitutes an "undue 
hardship." See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (I 0). 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12lii(R). 
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tionally, a claimant can demonstrate substantive discrimination by estab-
lishing that her employer failed to provide reasonable accommodations. 54 
This Note does not address the second evaluation of reasonable accom-
modation, instead focusing on how it affects whether a claimant is a 
"qualified individual with a disability."55 
The Supreme Court recently addressed reasonable accommodation as 
part of the prima facie case in an ADA employment claim in Cleveland 
v. Policy Management Systems Corp. 56 The lower courts had granted 
summary judgment to the employer because the plaintiff had, in a sepa-
rate action, applied for Social Security disability benefits, alleging in that 
claim that she was unable to work. 57 The lower courts had reasoned that 
because the plaintiff had alleged she was unable to work in the Social 
Security context, the courts should apply a presumption that she is not 
able to "perform the essential functions" of the job in the ADA context. 58 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Social Security claim 
and the ADA claim are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 59 One of the 
reasons for the reversal was that while the ADA requires courts to con-
sider reasonable accommodation when determining whether a claimant 
can "perform the essential functions" of the job, the Social Security Ad-
ministration does not consider any reasonable accommodations when de-
termining whether an individual is able to work.60 Nevertheless, the 
Court affirmed the position that to survive summary judgment in an 
ADA claim, a claimant must establish that she can "perform the essential 
functions [of the job], at least with 'reasonable accommodation. "'61 This 
case affirms the role that reasonable accommodation plays in determin-
ing whether a claimant is a "qualified individual with a disability."62 
Ill. NAWROT V. CPC INTERN A TJONAL 
A. Facts 
Ralph Nawrot ("Nawrot") began working for CPC International, now 
known as Bestfoods, Inc. ("Bestfoods"), in 1976.63 Nawrot was em-
54. See42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). 
56. 526 U.S. 795 (1999). 
57. See id at 798. 
58. See id at 799-800. 
59. See id at 802-03. 
60. See id at 797-98, 805-06. 
61. /d at 798. 
62. 42U.S.C.912111(8)(1994). 
63. See Nawrot, No. 99 C 630, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 8973, *4 (N.D. IlL June 21, 2000). 
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ployed as a warehouse supervisor for Bestfoods.64 He is a diabetic and 
sufferer of hypoglycemia who uses insulin and food to control his blood 
sugar level.65 There was a dispute over whether Bestfoods allowed Naw-
rot to take breaks to monitor his blood sugar level throughout his em-
ployment. 66 
In 1995, another Bestfoods employee complained of three comments 
Nawrot had made concerning her religion.67 In 1996, other employees 
accused Nawrot of embarrassing one supervisor and shouting at other 
employees. 68 On February 19, 1997, Nawrot refused to shake hands with 
a new employee, telling her, "I would shake your hand but I just went to 
the bathroom and did not wash my hands."69 Nawrot provided his plant 
manager with a note from his doctor indicating that Nawrot's hypogly-
cemia had caused him to make the statement, but the plant manager gave 
Nawrot a written warning indicating that "[f]uture occurrences of this or 
similar behavior will result in your termination."70 
Beginning in January 1997, Nawrot began requesting permission to 
take frequent short breaks because he was having more trouble with his 
hypoglycemic reactions. 71 Nawrot's supervisors did not grant that re-
quest, and Nawrot took a medical leave of absence. 72 In the application 
for that leave, Nawrot's doctor indicated that hypoglycemia had caused 
Nawrot's inappropriate behavior, including the February 19, 1997 inci-
dent.73 
Nawrot continued to request short breaks, but his supervisors rec-
ommended either transferring to the refinery or taking a short term dis-
ability leave and then applying for a long term disability leave.74 Nawrot 
declined both options because he knew that the refinery was going to be 
closed soon and because he was concerned about losing his job if he did 
not qualify for a long term disability leave.75 Nawrot's doctor indicated 
that he could return to work in April 1997, but Bestfoods prevented him 
from returning to work until June 1997.76 Nawrot continued to request 
64. See id. 
65. S<'eid 
66. See id at *4-5. 
67. See id at *5. 
68. See id at *6-7. 
69. !d at *7. 
70. !d at *R. 
71 See id 
72. See id at *S-9. 
73. See id at *9. 
74. Seeid 
75. S<'e id at *9-1 0. 
76. Seeid 
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accommodations to allow him to regulate his blood sugar at work, but 
alleged that he never received an affirmative response. 77 
In 1998, other employees complained of several instances of inap-
propriate behavior by Nawrot.n One employee accused Nawrot of yell-
ing at her and grabbing and twisting her arrn. 79 Nawrot admitted con-
fronting that employee but denied touching her. 80 Because of allegations 
that Nawrot was stalking and soliciting an employee that he had previ-
ously helped with an arbitration claim, a supervisor advised Nawrot to 
refrain from contact with that employee, who continued to file com-
! . . N XI p amts agamst awrot. 
In August 1998, Nawrot took a two-week vacation, during which 
time Bestfoods completed its investigation of the allegedly stalked em-
ployee's complaints, concluding "that Nawrot had ignored the order to 
avoid contact with [her, and] that he had harassed her, and that Nawrot 
had assisted her with the arbitration case against Bestfoods."82 Bestfoods 
terminated Nawrot on August 24, 1998.83 After receiving a right-to-sue 
letter from the EEOC, Nawrot brought a suit in federal district court al-
leging that Bestfoods violated both the disparate treatment and reason-
able accommodation components of the ADA.84 The suit also alleged 
violations of the retaliation provisions of the ADA 85 and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,86 as well as violations of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act ("ADEA").87 
B. The Court's Reasoning 
The court granted Bestfoods' motion for summary judgment on all 
counts.88 The ADA analysis focused on whether Nawrot was a "qualified 
individual with a disability."89 Because there was no dispute regarding 
whether Nawrot was able to perform his employment duties, he satisfied 
the "qualified individual" aspect. 90 Nawrot's claim that he was disabled 
77 S'ee 1d at *10. 
7X. Sc-e id. at *12-13. 
79. See"/.at*I2. 
XO. See id 
XI. See idat *!.>. 
E2. /J.at*l4. 
X:l. Si'e id 
X4. Sel' id. at * 15. 
X5. 42 lJ.S.C. ~ 122()](a) (1994). 
X6. 42 U.S. C.~~ 2000c-20()](a) ( 1994). 
X7. 29 U.S.C. ~~ 621-624 (1994); Nawrot. 2000 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS X973 at *I, 14. 
XX See Nawrot. 2000 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS X973 at *2X. 
X9. !d. at * 15. 
90. Sn• id 
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rested on two grounds: "that he [was] substantially limited in the major 
life activity of working,"91 and, in the alternative, "that he was regarded 
as disabled."92 
The court first pointed out that it must analyze Nawrot's diabetes 
"with reference to mitigating measures."93 The court then noted that 
Nawrot had experienced hypoglycemic reactions which had rendered 
him unconscious or incoherent while at work, but concluded "that they 
occurred when Nawrot was unable to successfully maintain his blood 
sugar level."94 The court determined that those incidents did not qualify 
Nawrot as disabled because they occurred "in the absence of corrective 
measures" and had not prevented Nawrot from performing his duties 
over the course of his employment.95 
Rejecting Nawrot's argument that he was "substantially limited in 
the major life activity of working,"96 the court pointed out that while 
Nawrot indicated classes of occupations in which he cannot work, his al-
legations did not discuss whether he would be precluded from those oc-
cupations with his diabetes and hypoglycemia in a corrected state. 97 The 
court also stated that "[ w ]ithout establishing this fact, for which he bears 
the burden of proof, Nawrot cannot withstand summary judgment."9s 
Turning to Nawrot's claims that he was regarded as disabled, the 
court stated that to satisfy that test, the employer must perceive Nawrot 
as unable to perform "a class or range of jobs."99 The court ruled that 
Nawrot had not satisfied that requirement. 100 
The court's explanation of why Nawrot was not a "qualified individ-
ual with a disability" demonstrates a problem with the Sutton mitigation 
rule. 101 Recognizing that "a question of material fact exists as to whether 
Bestfoods prohibited Nawrot from controlling his diabetic condition," 102 
the court pointed out that it was unable to reach that issue because Sutton 
requires that Nawrot be evaluated in his corrected state. 103 The court 
summed up the loophole created by the Sutton rule as follows: "the em-
91. !d. at * 16. 
92. !d. at* I X. 
93. !d. at* 16 (citing Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v United 
Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 ( 1999)). 
94. !d at *17. 
95. /d. 
96. !d. at * 16-1 X. 
97. See id. at *17-IX. 
9K !d. at* 18. 
99. !d. at * 19. 
100. See id. 
94. 42 U.S.C. ~ 12lll(X) (1994). 
102. !d at *20. 
103. See id. 
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player strips the plaintiff of all ameliorative measures, but in court, the 
judge pretends that the plaintiff is always clothed with those meas-
ures."104 The court pointed out that while the Supreme Court in Sutton 
noted that the "regarded as" prong might provide some relief to plain-
tiffs, 105 that prong did not help Nawrot. \(16 The court evaluated and dis-
missed all the other claims together. 107 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Nawrot Demonstrates the Loophole 
The summary judgment in Nawrot demonstrates a loophole for em-
ployers that the bifurcation of the ADA qualification test creates in con-
text of the mitigation requirements from Sutton. Under the first prong of 
the qualification test, the court ruled that Nawrot was not disabled be-
cause he was able to utilize mitigating measures. 10x However, part of that 
mitigation required Nawrot to control his diabetes with insulin and 
food. 109 While Nawrot alleged that Bestfoods prevented him from utiliz-
ing those mitigating measures by preventing him from taking breaks, be-
cause of the bifurcation of the qualification test the court could not ad-
dress the merits of that claim. 110 That test required the court to rule that 
because Nawrot could, under ideal circumstances, mitigate his condition 
through insulin and food, the case could not proceed. 111 The court could 
not advance to other issues, such as whether Nawrot's requested accom-
modation constituted a "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA, or 
whether Nawrot had a disability in his actual condition while Bestfoods 
was preventing him from utilizing his mitigating measures. 
B. This Loophole Allows Employers to Discriminate 
Nawrot's circumstances are comparable to a hypothetical situation in 
which an employee at a manufacturing plant has severe myopia, as did 
104. /d. at *21. 
I 05. Su: id See also Sutton. 527 U.S. at 490. 
I 06. See Nawrot, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEX IS WJ73 at *22. 
I 07. S'ee id at *22-28. Nawrot's other claims were hased on allegations that his termination 
was retaliatory. 
I OK s,e Nawrot, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 8973 at* 17-18. 
I 09. See id at *4. 
I I 0. See id at *20 ("'Here. a question of material h1et exists as to whether llestl(lods prohib-
ited Nawrot from controlling his diabetic condition. Yet according to .'>'ullon, this court cannot reach 
the question of discrimination because Nawrot is not deemed disabled when viewed in his corrected 
state."). 
I I I Se" id at * 19-20. 
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the plaintiffs in Sutton, but is able to perform the "essential functions" of 
her job through the use of a corrective lenses. Under this loophole, her 
employer could arbitrarily prevent her from using the corrective lenses at 
the plant and then terminate her because she cannot perform her job 
without them. Under the bifurcated qualification test and the mitigation 
requirements from Sutton, this employee would be barred from bringing 
a claim under the ADA. Under Sutton, individuals with myopia who can 
correct that condition probably do not qualify as disabled for ADA pur-
poses.112 Under the bifurcated qualification test, the inquiry ends there. A 
court is unable to evaluate whether allowing the employee to use the cor-
rective lenses would constitute a "reasonable accommodation" under the 
ADA, or whether the employee has a disability while being prevented 
from using corrective lenses. 
C. Single Qualification Test Eliminates the Loophole 
A single qualification test, combining the first two requirements for a 
prima facie case into a single evaluation, 113 could close this loophole for 
employers without affecting other ADA cases. Under this test, a court 
would determine whether a claimant is a "qualified individual with a dis-
ability"114 under a single evaluation. The court would evaluate whether 
the claimant has a disabiliti 15 in context of whether the claimant is a 
"qualified individual," meaning that the claimant, "with or without rea-
sonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em-
1 . . "116 p oyment positiOn. 
This single qualification test would allow courts to consider mitiga-
tion and reasonable accommodation in concert. A claimant whose condi-
tion is not a disability because she can utilize mitigating measures to con-
trol her condition would be a "qualified individual with a disability" 117 if 
the employer fails to provide reasonable accommodations, preventing her 
from utilizing those measures. 11 x This approach would still require the 
claimant's condition, in the state created by the employer's accommoda-
tion or failure to accommodate, to meet the ADA definition of "disabil-
ity."119 The court would not evaluate the claimant based on the mitigation 
112. Sci' 5iutton. 527 U.S. at 488-89. 
113. S!'e supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
114. 42U.S.C.912lll(X)(l994). 
I 15. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
117. Jd 
II X. This inquiry would require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the corrective measures she is 
requesting the employer to allow her to make fall within the limits of reasonable accommodation. 
See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
I 19. SCI! supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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she could hypothetically utilize, but based on the mitigation the claim-
ant's employer allows her to utilize. This test bases the evaluation on the 
claimant's actual condition rather than her hypothetical or potential con-
dition. 
Nevertheless, under this approach Nawrot would not necessarily 
have survived summary judgment. The court indicated that it was unable 
to address whether Bestfoods discriminated against Nawrot by prevent-
ing him from taking breaks or whether those requested breaks constituted 
reasonable accommodation. 120 The court also gave a cursory evaluation 
of whether Nawrot was a "qualified individual" without evaluating the 
role that reasonable accommodation plays in that determination. 121 Using 
a single qualification test, the court could have evaluated whether Best-
foods' failure to reasonably accommodate Nawrot created a condition in 
which Nawrot's impairments constituted a disability. 
The court might have determined that the breaks Nawrot was re-
questing to monitor his diabetes did not constitute a reasonable accom-
modation. Additionally, the court might have determined that even while 
being prevented from taking breaks Nawrot still did not have a disability. 
However, under the bifurcated qualification test, the court was not able 
to address these crucial questions. 
Under a single qualification test, the outcome would not have been 
certain. The facts warranted more than the cursory evaluation that the bi-
furcated qualification test required, which mandated the conclusion that 
because diabetes is controllable, Nawrot was not disabled. The bifurcated 
qualification approach essentially creates a per se rule, excluding every 
condition that can be controlled from disability status, regardless of indi-
vidual circumstances that might prevent an individual from utilizing the 
mitigation. While the single qualification test would not solve this prob-
lem for all individuals with a disability who do not usc potential mitigat-
ing measures, it would at least enable an individual whose employer pre-
vents her from utilizing mitigating measures to have a greater chance of 
surviving summary judgment in her ADA claim. 122 
120. See supra note I 00 and accompanying text. 
121. Nawrot, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS R973 at *15. 
122. Another case where the single qualification test might have provided a more appropriate 
evaluation is Hein v. All America Plvwood Co. Inc., 232 F.3d 4R2 (6th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff, a 
truck driver who used blood pressure medication, alleged that he had been terminated because he 
refused to make a delivery that was longer than his normal schedule and would have caused him to 
run out of his blood pressure medication before the delivery was complete. Sec id. at 4X5-R7. The 
court evaluated the plaintiff in his medicated state, concluding that it was the plaintiff's own fiJU!t 
that he would have run out of medication during the delivery, and holding that the plaintiff was not 
disabled under the ADA because he was not disabled in his medicated state . • ')cc id. at 4X7-XX. It cer-
tainly would have been more appropriate fix the court to apply the single qualification test and 
evaluate whether the plaintiff was disabled in context of whether the plaintifrs request to avoid the 
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Just as the outcome in Nawrot under the single qualification test 
would not have been certain, this approach would not create the potential 
for significantly increased litigation. Plaintiffs would still have to estab-
lish that they meet all of the requirements to be a "qualified individual 
with a disability." 123 This approach likely would not change the outcome 
in a great number of cases. It would, however, open the potential to cor-
rect one injustice that currently cannot be corrected under the ADA, 
where an employer fails to provide reasonable accommodations to allow 
an employee to manage a controllable condition. 
D. The Single Qual~fication Test is Consistent with the Text of the ADA 
The text of the ADA supports the single qualification test. While the 
statute provides a definition of "disability,"124 it does not establish that 
definition as the threshold question that courts have interpreted it to be. 
That definition appears in the introductory sections of the ADA, not in 
Title I, which contains the provisions relating to employment discrimina-
tion. However, Title I of the ADA clearly establishes a broader threshold 
question for a claimant: whether she is a "qualified individual with a dis-
ability."125 This phrase is more properly considered in its entirety, con-
sidering how "qualified" and "disability" relate to each other. The bifur-
cated qualification test, however, creates two categories of individuals 
with a disability: ( 1) individuals with a disability and (2) qualified indi-
viduals with a disability. 
This bifurcated qualification test can result in a plaintiff who fits the 
second category because her employer fails to reasonably accommodate 
her essential mitigating measures, but loses at summary judgment be-
cause those mitigating measures are hypothetically available, and thus 
she does not fit the more restricted definition of the first category. The 
statute, on its face, does not establish two categories of disabled persons. 
The definition of disability is positioned in the statute so that it is most 
reasonably read as a supplement to the definition of a "qualified individ-
ual with a disability" 126 contained in Title I. 
The tendency of the courts to utilize the statutory definition of dis-
ability as the threshold question may be the result of inadequate appre-
longer delivery was a reasonable accommodation under ADA guidelines. By applying the bifurcated 
qualification test, the court was able to avoid the issue of whether the plaintiffs request was a rea-
sonable accommodation, tersely concluding that the plaintiffs circumstances were his own fault 
without evaluating those circumstances under reasonable accommodation guidelines. 
123. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
124. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
125. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8). "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individ-
ual with a disability." 42 U.S. C. § 12112(a) ( 1994). 
126. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
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ciation of a fundamental difference between disability discrimination and 
other areas of discrimination. A claimant who is a member of a protected 
class for race or age discrimination is generally a static member of that 
class. The group of individuals Congress designed the ADA to protect is 
much less static. An individual's physical or mental condition may 
change from day to day. General changes in technology and treatment 
procedures as well as specific changes in an individual's financial status 
or employment conditions can drastically alter that individual's ability to 
employ mitigating measures. The drafters of the ADA demonstrated their 
understanding of this reality by defining a "qualified individual with a 
disability" to include consideration of reasonable accommodation. 127 The 
Supreme Court also has pointed out this reality in recent decisions. 
E. The Single Qualification Test is Consistent with Recent Supreme 
Court Decisions 
While the Supreme Court has never made reasonable accommoda-
tions by an employer a factor in the determination of whether an em-
ployee has a disability, the reasoning from recent Supreme Court deci-
sions lends some support to the single qualification test. The Court 
addressed the role of reasonable accommodation in defining a "qualified 
individual with a disability" in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems 
Corp.m Pointing out the differences between the appropriate evaluations 
for an ADA plaintiff and an applicant for Social Security Disability In-
surance benefits, the Court noted that "the ADA defines a 'qualified in-
dividual' to include a disabled person 'who ... can perform the essential 
functions' of her job 'with reasonable accommodation."' 129 Whether an 
employer provides reasonable accommodations to allow an employee 
with a disability to utilize mitigating measures is clearly a factor in de-
termining whether that employee is a "qualified individual." 130 
As one of the justifications for applying the mitigation standard in 
Sutton, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the ADA "is properly read as 
requiring that a person be presently - not potentially or hypothetically -
substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability." 131 One author, 
while arguing that employers should not consider mitigating measures 
that employees choose not to utilize, pointed out that "[ o ]ne thing seems 
evident from the [Sutton Trilogy]; it is the actual condition that the em-
ployee presents herself in at the time of consideration which is pertinent 
127. See42U.S.C§12111(8). 
128. 526 U.S. 795 (1999). 
129. /d. at 803 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1 (8)). 
130. 42U.S.C.§ 12111(8). 
131. Sutton v. United Airlines. Inc., 527 U.S. 471,482 ( 1999). 
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to the disability inquiry." 132 Where an employer fails to reasonably ac-
commodate an individual and prevents her from utilizing mitigating 
measures, the employee clearly is presently disabled, and a court could 
only consider the employee not to be disabled in a potential or hypotheti-
cal sense. 
1. Single qualification test treats individuals as individuals 
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that "whether a person has a dis-
ability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry." 133 She also noted 
that whether an individual is disabled "depends on whether the limita-
tions an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substan-
tially limiting." 134 That "individualized inquiry" 135 does not seem consis-
tent with a test that mandates that no controllable condition qualifies as a 
disability. An individual's condition under the restrictions her employer 
places on her is the relevant condition in which to evaluate the "limita-
tions an individual with an impairment actually faces." 136 The per se rule 
that the bifurcated qualification test promotes runs directly counter to an-
other reason Justice O'Connor provided for the mitigation rule - to pre-
vent individuals from being "treated as members of a group of people 
with similar impairments, rather than as individuals." 137 
In Albertson's, the Supreme Court pointed out that under the ADA 
individuals must "prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent 
of the limitation in terms of their own experience ... is substantial."m 
An individual's "own expcrience" 139 certainly includes the restrictions 
her employer places on her. The single qualification test is consistent 
with the reasoning in Sutton and Albertson's. The test simply combines 
the mitigation requirements for defining a disability the Supreme Court 
articulated in Sutton with the requirement the Court noted in Cleveland 
that the determination of whether an individual is a "qualified individ-
1"140 . 'd . f h h h I .d ua reqmres const eratiOn o w et er er emp oyer provt es reason-
able accommodations. These two standards easily fit together into a sin-
gle qualification test to determine whether a claimant is a "qualified 
individual with a disability." 141 
132. Dickinson, supra note I X, at 39g_ 
133. Sutton, 527 U.S. at. 4R3. 
134. ld at 488. 
135. !d. at 4X3. 
136. !d. Sc>e Dickinson, supru note 18, at 400-0 I. 
137. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 4g3-84. 
138. A/her/son's, Inc. v. Kirkinghurg, 527 U.S. 567 ( 1999). 
139. ld 
140. 42 U.S.C. ~ 12lll(g) (1994). 
141. !d 
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2. Per se rules are inappropriate 
The Supreme Court has declined to establish a per se rule for defin-
ing a disability under the ADA in another context. While the Court in 
1998 decided that HIV infection in a particular case was a disability un-
der the ADA, the Court declined to determine "whether HIV infection is 
a per se disability under the ADA." 142 While ruling that HIV infection 
substantially limited the plaintiff in the major life activity of reproduc-
tion, 143 by declining to establish a per se rule for HIV infection, the Court 
implied that the necessary individual inquiry might be different under 
other circumstances. 144 Other federal court decisions show that similar 
conditions may qualify as a disability under the ADA in some scenarios, 
but not in others. 145 These cases further demonstrate that a per se rule is 
inappropriate in ADA cases. Such cases require an individualized inquiry 
into the claimant's circumstances, including factors such as employer 
policies that may prevent the claimant from utilizing corrective meas-
ures. While the bifurcated qualification test promotes a per se rule requir-
ing that a controllable condition does not constitute a disability under the 
ADA, the single qualification test better facilitates the individualized in-
quiry that is necessary in ADA claims, allowing a broader, more indi-
vidualized inquiry into the claimant's particular circumstances. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Current federal court standards create a bifurcated qualification test 
for ADA claimants to maintain an action for employment discrimination. 
That test requires the claimant to establish first that she is disabled, in 
light of any corrective measures, and then that she is a "qualified indi-
vidual."146 The bifurcated qualification test essentially promotes a per se 
142. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 ( 1998). 
143. Seeid at637-41. 
144. But see Jones v. Rehab. Hosp. of Ind., No. 00-0681-C-T/G, 2000 WL 1911884, at *8 
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 29, 2000) (recognizing that the Supreme Court declined to establish a per se rule for 
HIV infection under the ADA, but nevertheless holding that "both the agency interpretation of the 
ADA and the Act's legislative history support the conclusion that Congress intended HIV infection 
to be a per se disability."). 
I45. See, e.g., Gasser v. Ramsey, 125 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that the side ef-
fects of the anticoagulant medication Coumadin qualified as a disability under the ADA); Samul v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2000 WL 1480890 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that in light of the plaintiffs 
individual circumstances and activities, the side effects ofCoumadin were not sufficient to qualify as 
a disability under the ADA); Boone v. Reno, 121 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that a 
plaintiff who controlled her asthma through medication was not disabled under the ADA); Riebe v. 
E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, Inc., 2000 WL 1566516 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (holding that even while 
using asthma medication, the plaintiff was substantially limited in her ability to breathe, walk, and 
run). 
146. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). 
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rule mandating that no correctable condition can ever quality as a dis-
ability under the ADA. That test also allows an employer to prevent an 
employee with a disability from utilizing mitigating measures, and pre-
vents that employee from bringing an ADA claim under those circum-
stances. Under existing precedent there is no redress for that injustice 
which is clearly, to borrow a phrase used by Justice O'Connor in a dif-
ferent context, "contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the ADA." 147 
Courts should adopt a single qualification test, considering whether 
the claimant has a "disability" and whether the claimant is a "qualified 
individual" in concert. In the case of an individual whose condition re-
quires mitigating measures, this inquiry may involve an investigation 
into whether the employer has provided reasonable accommodations to 
allow the individual to utilize those measures. This test is consistent with 
the text of the ADA, which prohibits employment discrimination against 
a "qualified individual with a disability" and defines that phrase to in-
clude consideration of the reasonable accommodation the employer pro-
vides to that individual. 14x This test is also consistent with recent Su-
preme Court precedent requiring an individualized evaluation of 
claimants in ADA cases, evaluating claimants in their actual present 
condition, rather than in a potential or hypothetical condition. 
Most importantly, the single qualification test creates the potential to 
correct an injustice. Currently, employers who prevent employees from 
utilizing mitigating measures do not have to answer for that policy in any 
forum. The proposed test would simply make employers accountable to 
justify those actions. Courts could evaluate whether the requested ac-
commodations constitute reasonable accommodations, where they now 
must dismiss the case without addressing that issue. An enumerated pur-
pose of the ADA is "the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities." 149 While there are countless obstacles preventing the 
fulfillment of that goal, the single qualification test is a simple way to 
eliminate one of those obstacles. 
147. Sutton v. United Airlines. Inc .. 527 US 471,484 (1999). 
14X. Si'e supra text accompanying note 50. 
149. 42 U.S.C 1i 121 Ol(b)( I) ( 1994). 
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